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Security Information

Official Diary

Thursday, 16 October 1952

1. Informed the DCI of the postponement of the NSC Senior Staff meeting and the reason therefor.

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3. Attended IAC meeting.

4. Following the IAC, spoke to [redacted] on the following points:

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[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1A2G 7. Approved [REDACTED] 25X1A9A recommendation that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

8. Lunch with Dr. Kent and [REDACTED] 25X1A9A during which time we discussed the following points:

a. I felt that Stalin's speech was a serious declaration of cold war.

[REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] During a hot war, forces would be concentrated and applied at strategic points, and there were various forms of pressure that could be applied, including an attack on the home land that would relieve us of the necessity of having substantial concentrations of forces at all points of the perimeter. I felt that none of the estimating papers had as yet really dealt with this issue or

[REDACTED]
I felt that the so-called relaxation of tension paper should be brought off the back of the stove and brushed up into a "change of pace and its implications" paper for consideration by the IAC immediately following NIE 64 and 65. Dr. Kent agreed and undertook to review the present terms of reference for this paper.

b.

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[REDACTED]

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equal terms with the policy-makers and planners, rather than to submit a contribution which could be dealt with by policy-makers and planners as they see fit. We reached no conclusions, but agreed to keep this subject under continuing study.

9. Discussed the following with DCI:

- a. I expressed my view that Stalin's speech was an open declaration of a major intensification of the cold war, comparable to the creation of the Comintern and he, in turn, showed me his memorandum to that effect. I further informed DCI that during luncheon Sherman Kent and I had discussed laying on an estimate to cover basically two questions, namely,

- (1) Will there be a major change of pace in Soviet cold war activities, and
- (2) What are its implications?

With respect to this latter point, I expressed the view that rather than permitting us to relax, even in the armament field, we should be called upon to prepare and expend increasing resources, since cold war activities of this type did not permit of the concentration of force and economy of effort which could be brought about in a hot war situation. DCI agreed. I further

[REDACTED]

to Sherman Kent about this estimate and suggested that it be moved in priority ahead of NIE 65. I feel that 65, a long-term paper, would be much better if they had 64 and a change of pace paper to rely upon. One criticism I had of our current estimates was that they were so pointed toward the question of whether or not a hot war would break out, that they tended to play down the serious implications of a continuation, or intensification, of the cold war.)

[REDACTED]


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- (1) That at some reasonable time in advance of such a conference, a request be directed to DCI for the preparation of an appropriate NIE.

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10. [redacted] reviewed with me current plans for [redacted] and I approved dispatch of a cable from me to [redacted] explaining the reasons why we desired to continue to deal with this matter in Washington. I did not feel, in the light of the full background, that it was necessary to clear this cable with DCI [redacted]

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